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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CLARENCE M. BECK,
Plaintiff and Appellam,t,
-vs.-

DUT·CHlVIAN COALITION MINES
COMPANY, a corporation,

Case
No. 8011

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANIT
"

STATEMENT OF CAS·E
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant for legal and other services p·erformed by the plaintiff for the defendant during the period extending from
August 19·21 to October 15, 1951 (R. 1). In its answer
the defendant alleged that it has paid the plaintiff for
the services rendered by him, except the sum of $1000.00
and further alleges that plaintiff's claim is barred by the
provisions of U.·C.A. 1953, 104-2-23. The action was tried
with a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
$1'500.00 ·(R. 19-22). A motion for a new trial was made
by the plaintiff, which was denied (R.. 45·-48). Plaintiff
prosecutes an appeal to this Court from the judgment.

1
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It is necessary for this court to review the evidence
offered and received at the trial to pass upon some of
the errors which appellant contends entitles him to a
reversal of the judgment and the granting of a new trial.
We shall, therefore, give a brief abstract of the evidence:
Clarence M. Beck was called and testified on his
own behalf as follows: (Note': The pages where the evidence may be found are by the Court Reporter at the top
of the page. The letter R refers to the judgment roll, the
letters Tr to the transcript.)
That he is and for 40 years last past, he has been a
duly licensed and practicing attorney at law in Utah (Tr.
1 to 3). ·That he was employed by the defendant corporation in August 1921 and has been its attorney continuously since that time ( Tr. 5 to 6). That during all of tJ1e
time since 19·21 the office of plain tiff was also the office
of the defendant company; that at the time plaintiff 'vas
employed, it was agreed that he would he liberally paid
when there was money available with which to pay hin1
and that he would be paid some money fro1n thne to ti1ne
for expenses.
That during the year 1921, the witness attended to
routine correspondence and 1nade two or three trips to
the mine to ascertain if the reports were true about there
being some good ore uncovered in the mine (Tr. 10);
that defendant con1pany was incorporated for one 1nillion
shares of which Mr. Holden owned about 9/10 or 4/5
(Tr. 11). That the witness prepared the by-la,vs of the
company and they \Vere adopted in PithPr 1921 or 19~2

2
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(Tr. 12-13). The by-la,vs of the co1npany were admitted
in evidence, the san1e being on pages 7 to 15· of the
n1inute book, Exhibit 3-7. Mr. Holden acted as general
tnanager, treasurer and secretary, but the witness did
not know he was formally appointe·d ('Tr. 16). It was
admitted by counsel 'for defendant that Mr. Holden held
the controlling interest in the defendant comp·any from
the beginning and that he was the Inanaging dire'Ctor
from and after 19~22; and that the plaintiff was employed
as the attorney for the comp·any, including the preparation of minutes, by-laws, leases and the conducting of
the litigation for the defendant company ('T·r. 19).
Plaintiff further testified. that in 1921 after the
defendant company was formed, Mr. Holden stated that
it was necessary to have an office, an attorne-y and a
director in Utah; that he wanted Mr. Beck to serve as
attorney and that from time to time Mr. Beck would
be paid-some money on account and for exp·enses; that
he desired plaintiff to look after levying of assessments.,
securing lessors and the business generally because he,
Holden (would be in Los Angeles (Tr. 21). That in
l9'21 the witness assisted Ed· Senior in getting patent
to the property by contacting the engineers and seeing
that the mining property was prop.erly marked; that
in 1921 he made 4 trips to the mine in American Fork
Canyon; that Mr. Holden told the witness to keep him
informed about the n1ine; that it i·s about 60 miles up
to the mine which is in American Fork Canyon (Tr. 2·2) ;
that Mr. Holden gave some stock to the witness, Ran3
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dolph, Haas, and Samuelson so they could serve as
directors I(Tr. 2'3).
The By-laws were prepared and adopted in 1922 and
several letters were written concerning the assessment.
That the witness prepared the assessment and the resolution levying the same was passed (Tr. 26). Numerous
of the 600 letters written were offered and received in
evidence ( Tr. 28). After considerable negotiations, he
prepared a lease in 1922 (Tr. 29). There were about 10
consultations before the terms of the lease were agreed
to. Mr. Holden was rarely in Utah and the business
had to be done by telephone or by correspondence ( Tr.
30). That the lessee, Mr. Wild, and his son operated
the property under the lease in 1922 (Tr. 30). That the
stockholders in the Old Dutchman were given shares
in The Dutchman Coalition; that the witness brought
in the Old Dutchman under an execution sale and forn1ed
the Dutchman Coalition, defendant herein ( Tr. 33).
That in 1922 the witness had considerable negotiations
with Watson and others for the lease of defendant's
property; provided they could n1ake a deal with Wild
who held a lease (Tr. 34). There were a nwuber of
resignations of officers in 1922; the witness kept and
wrote up the minutes of the meetings (Tr. 34). That
in 1922 the witnes.s made trips to the 1nine and consulted with people who came into the office err. 38).
That in 1923 stockholders list of delin4uents on
assesstnent \vas worked over and \rork done to,varus
securing patent and securing inforrnation requir~d by
4
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Senior & Senior 'vho 'vere doing the legal work of
securing· patent (Tr. 39). In 1923 negotiations were
had with a ~Ir. Bourne about a lease, but no agreement
'vas reached. That a ~Ir. Kersha\v had been acting as
engineer for the mine, but he lost his commission and a
new engineer was secured which made it necessary for
the 'vitness to make several trips up to the mine to fix
up the n1onuments and get copies of plats, etc. A Mr.
A. W. Stowe- desired to lease the property and th~~
matter was taken up with Mr. Holden (Tr. 40). That
Mr. Holden finally rejected the lease. Numerous additional letters of correspondence with Mr. Holden were
offered and received in evidence (Tr. 41-42).
That in 1924 the witness checked the proof of labor
from July 1, 1923 to July 1, 19'24, there were five or
six claims and a mill site (Tr. 43). That in 1924 there
was a controversy with the two Wilds as to whose
property the apex or some ore was on and the services
of Clair Hogan was secured in connection with that
controversy. That the witness negotiated and drew a
lease with Heber Wild in 192·4 ('Tr. 45). That pursuant
to the lease, Mr. Wild went into the possession of the
property and opened up some valuable ore (Tr. 46).
That in 1924, the witness made not less than 4 trips to
the mine. That the witness had considerable correspondence 'vith 11r. Holden about the operation of the
mine in 1924 (Tr. 47). Numerous other letters to and
fro1n

~lr.

Holden in 1924 were offered and received in

evidence and marked CC (Tr. 50).

;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In 1925 there was additional work done in clearing
up the title to the defendant company's mine; that A. G.
Knowlton completed his survey and his work was checked
(Tr. 51). There were some missing records in the title
and Mr. Kershaw had "flubbed up" the monu1nents (Tr.
52). Mr. Kershaw had commenced the work when his
commiS'sion was revoked and the work had to be done
all over again. ·That a Mr. Charles Mercer wanted a
lease on the mine dumps and he can1e to the office at
least 5 or 6 times; that there were at least 10 or 15
conferences about the lease and the witness was compelled to go to the mine one night ('Tr. 54). That assays
had to be 1nade of the material in the dumps; that it
was the desire of Mr. Holden and the Board of Directors
that the n1ine be continued to be active and to keep it
active was part of the service of the witness. That
considerable correspondence was had in 1925 (Tr. 55).
Some of the correspondence had in 1925 was admitted
in evidence and marked Exhibit DD (Tr. 56).
That in 1926 a dispute arose about an assay of the
dumps which made it necessary to make ·some extra
trips to the mine; that the witness made not less than
5 trips to the 1nine in 1926; that in making the trips to
the mine, the witness -furnished his own conveyances
(Tr. 61). Part of the correspondence had in 1926 concerning the operation of the mine was received in evidence and marked FF. That the proof of labor on the
property was prepared and recorded by the witness
in 1926 (Tr. 62). That the work done in 1927 was a
repetition of what was done in 1926. That in 1927 not

6
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less than three trips were Inade to the n1ine; that the
witness prepared and filed proof of labor for 1927 ('Tr.
63). That son1e of the correspondence with respect to
operation of the defendant mine was received in evidence
as Exhibit GG.
That in 1928 it 'vas discovered that there was some
of the record missing in the foreclosure of the property
formerly owned by the Old Dutchman and now owned
by the defendant. The Sheriff's Deed and Affidavit
supporting it were lost and it required straightening out
(Tr. 65). That in 1928 the \vitness made at least 12
trips to Provo on that matter. That it was necessary
to have a good title before a p·atent will issue; that in
1928 Mr. Holden proposed to levy an assessment of
lj20th of one cent per share on the stock of the defendant
company and to make the assessment in California. That
the witness made an investigation of the law as to
whether a levy could be made on the· stock of the defendant company by a Board of Directors meeting held in
California and concluded that such a levy could not be
validly made. That the witness spent fully
day and
a half at the c·apitol Building looking up the law in that
matter (Tr. 67). Part of the correspondence had by
Mr. Beck affecting the operation of defendant's mine
was marked HH and received in evidence (Tr. 68).

a

That in 1929 the price of metals fell and the witness
was unable to get anyone interested in the mine; that
he made 3 or 4 trips to the mine during the year.
That in 1930 Willard Cle·ghorn negotiated for a
deal to lease the n1ine; that he talked to Mr. Cleghorn

7
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several tin1es about making a lease ( Tr. 69). The "~it
ness had some negotiations with some people about taking over the lease held by Heber Wild who was very
discouraged. That during 1930 the witness attempted
to get the Sheriff of Utah County to locate the nrissing
papers in the foreclosure proceedings (Tr. 70). That
during the year 1930 conference was had with Elias W.
Gee, Marcellus Pope, the. district attorney, the county
attorney and the District Judge in an attempt to get
substitutions for the lost documents affecting the title
to the property of defendant. Not less than 3 or 4 trips
were made to the mine in 1930. That the five letters
marked II were written in 1930 touching the operation
of the mine of the defendant (Tr. 72).
In 1931 very little was done 1n the 1natter of
operating the mine. That in 1932 some protests were
filed on the Wild Dutchman claim (Tr. 73). That because
of the protest to the proceedings to secure patents, it
became necessary to send Charlie Mercer up to the
mine to make discoveries. It is necessary to have what
is referred to as discoveries to secure patent~. You
must also have a good title and proper 111arkings to get
patent. That to see that this is done, the witness 1nade
not less than 5 trips to the 1nine in 1932 (Tr. 7-!). J~art
of the correspondence for 1932, consisting of six letters,
was marked J J and received in evidence.
That in 1933 the Mereer lea~e was rescinded ( 'rr.
75). That Mr. Mercer wa~ gophering around on thP
property in 1933 and the "' i tness 'vent np to the property

8
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to see 'vhat was being done. That part of the correspondence had in 19'33 was received in evidence and
marked KK (Tr. 76). That in 1934 Mr. A. W. Stowe
'vas negotiating with the witness and others to secure a
lease on the defendant's mine and other mining properties; that ~Ir. Holden was not satisfied with Mr.
Stowe's offer (Tr. 77). That in 1935 Charlie Mercer was
working the property; that in 1936 J. C. Jensen at
Mercer's instance got interested in the Dutchman and
ca1ne to the office of the witness not less than 25 times
during 1935-1936 (Tr. 78) about leasing the mine of
the defendant. That part of the correspondence had
with respect to the mine of defendant is marked LL and
was received in evidence.
In 1937 further negotiations were had about consolidating the operation of the Dutchman and Mills
Hill and Pacific claims; that to accomplish this it was
necessary to get consent of the· Knight Investment Company of Provo which required 7 or 8 conferences at
Provo (T·r. 79). That plan failed because a Mr. Norden
and Wilhite were not willing to pay the money asked
by the Knight property. That in 1937, not less than
four trips were made to the mine; that Mr. Holden
desired to hold a directors meeting in Los Angeles to
levy an assessment of 1j10th of one cent on the stock
of the company. The witness advised against doing so · ·
because upon investigation he found it doubtful if that
could be done (Tr. 80). That a meeting of the Board of
Directors was then called here in Salt Lake City. That
at that meeting, resoultion,,vas passed to pay Mr. Holden

9
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his back salary and an assessment of one cent per share
on the stock of the· con1pany was proposed by Mr. Holden.
That the witness prepared the necessary resolution and
notices of the assessment and the minutes of the same
( Tr. 81). That the witness was directed to buy all the
stock upon which assessment was not paid; that a Mr.
John Gottron, a prominent financier of Chicago and a
stockholder of the defendant company carne to the meeting of the stockholders and n1ade several threats (Tr.
82). That a great amount of time was spent to keep
Mr. Gottron from suing the compiany; that ~fr. Gottron
said Holden did not know anything about operating a
mine; that he was merely bleeding the mine and the
witness was told by Mr. Holden to try to keep hin1
quiet (Tr. 84). That the witness drew up the minutes
for the assessment meetings, waiver of notice, oath of
office. That Mr. Holden wanted a report of what was
going on at the mine and respecting the stock and Mr.
Gottron. That Mr. Holden sent the witness a certifi'cate
for 10,000 shares; that there were negotiations had in
1937 with Mr. Mercer and Alma Bourne respecting a
lease on the property of the defendant. That during
that year not less than 6 trips were made by the witness
to the property, including the trips with ~lr. Gottron
(Tr. 85). Part of the correspondence had touching the
operation of the nune of the defendant was. received in
evidence and marked MM.
That in 1938 a I\ I r. Scowcroft of ()gden atte111pted to
get a lease, but did not ( Tr. 86). rrhat in 1938 l\f r. Ahua
Bourne was anxious to get a lease of the 1nine nnrl Mr.
10
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~lercer

also desired a lease. That negotiations were had
with ~Ir. Bourne and finally he got a lease-; that Mr.
Gottron 'vas insisting that son1eone who knew something
about Inining be secured to operate the property and
~Ir. Holden suggested that the witne-ss secure the services
of a mining engineer, and the witness talked to Harry
Ruse about taking the job ('Tr. 87). That the witness
spent considerable time 'vith Mr. Ruse and went to the
mine with him, but the compensation he was to receive
for his services was never agreed to by Mr. Holden.
That in 1938 it was made- to appear that Alma Bourne
did not want the lease for himself, but desired to sublease the same (Tr. 88). That in 1938 the witness made
not less than 6 trips to the mine-. Nine letters marked
Exhibit NN were received in evidence as part of th~
correspondence had in 1938 touching the operation of
the mine of defendant.
In 1939, Willard Cleghorn became very much
interested in the mine. As soon as the snow was off,
he took the witness to the mine to se-e what was going
on. He and Alma Bourne talked to the witness a great
deal about the mine ('Tr. 89). Later in the S.p·ring or
Summer, Willard (Cleghorn) took the witness up to the
mine to se·e what was going on. Cleghorn and Bourne
attempted to make a deal on operating the_ mine. The
defendant company was intere-sted in keeping the mineoperating (Tr. 90). That the witness told Mr. Bourne
that his lease vvould be revoked unless he got someone
on his lease with sufficient money to operate the mine.
That during all this time there was no one in Utah

11
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except the witness upon whom process could be served
(Tr. 91). The only person in Utah to take care of the
business of the company was the witness. That in 1939
Bert Scott complained about the operation of the 1nine
and threatened to resign, but the witness prevailed upon
him not to do so (Tr. 92). Part of the correspondence
had in 1939 touching the business of the defendant is
marked 00 and was received in evidence. That at least
four trips were made to the mine in 1939. That in 1939,
trouble developed ahout men being gassed in the mine of
the defendant and considerable time was spent by the
witness in ascertaining whether or not the defendant
was liable for any injury that might be caused by the
gas CTr. 93).
That Mr. Bourne had assigned his lease of the
property to a syndicate which was in charge of the
property. That c·arbon dioxide gas formed in the urine
in a moving fault; the gas was so heavy that it could
be carried out in a bucket ; when poured on a candle
it would put out the san1e; that in 1940 the witness did
considerable briefing as to whether or not the defendant
company was liable for any injury sustained by the
men who were injured or killed with gas. The \vitness
also took up with the people in charge of the 1nine the
1natter of switching over to electricity and put in bigger
blowers to re1nove the gas. That in 1940, the witness
made about 8 trips to the mine. That the lease on the
mine was assigned to the Golden West 1\tline and Leasing
Co1npany and upon the direction A~Ir. IIoluen, the \\'itness (Tr. 94:) went carefully into not only the question

12
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of the liability of the defendant company as to the gas,
but also the subrogation of the lease to the Golden West
Co1npany. That trouble was developed about the ground
being drununy and the tilnber not being able to carry
the weight. That the witness took up to the mine Paul
Peterson to see "'"hat should and could be done to take
care of the situation (Tr. 95). That it was discovered
in 1940 that the title of the defendant was probably
defective and a deed was pTepared and executed to the
defendant company by Harvey Holden. ·That in 1940 the
witness assisted the lessees of the defendant's mine to
secure a better arrangement for the sale of the ore,
if that could be done the defendant company would also
get more from the sale of the ore (Tr. 96). The company got a royalty. Letters 1narked PP was received
in evidence as p-art of the correspondence had in 19;40
touching the busine·ss of the defendant company (Tr. 98).
That the defendant company never paid the witness
anything for the use of the office, but used it at all
times. That in 1941 the comp·any consented to Alma
Bourne assigning his lease to the Golden West and to
assigning the lease to the U. S. S·melter as security for
a loan. The witness attended to that business. That a
resolution was passed upon motion of Mr. Holden that
he be given a salary of $500.00 per month; that he be
reimbursed $1700.00 for expense~; that he was elected
Treasurer, General l\Ianager and that Marie Holden be
elected secretary. The witness attended these meetings
and drew up the minutes (Tr. 98). That negotiations
were had for Mr. Cleghorn to take over th~ operations
of the 1nine from the Golden West and for making a
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deal with the American Smelting and Refining Co1npany
to furnish its talent, equipment and money; that in an
attempt to consumate an agreement, the witness made
7 or 8 trips to Provo; that the matter was taken up
with Mr. Booth and Mr. Gardner who were members
of the Golden West; that later the An1erican Sn1elting
& Refining Company (TT. 9·9) returned the data that
had been turned over to it by the witness and said they
could not accept the terms of the Golden West. That
in 1941 the mine was operating and a number of people
were interested ( Tr. 101). Part of the correspondence
with respect to the operation of the defendant company
was marked Exhibit QQ. Suit against Golden West was
authorized in 1942 (Tr. 102). The suit was prosecuted
until they agreed to take Mr. Cleghorn in with them.
The suit was brought at Provo ('Tr. 103). Kelly and
Gottron were threatening suit again ('Tr. 104). That
conversations were had with Mr. Holden in 1939 to 46
about the trouble with Kelly and Gottron (Tr. 105). That
the witness was told to try to keep them quiet. In 1942
the mine filled up with water and the witness investigated the cause therefor ('Tr. 106). That the Business
Regulations Commission wrote the witness letters and
came to the office of the witness about fraudulent securities ('Tr. 107). That the witness has extensive negotiations with Mr. Cleghorn about the use of his Pquipinf\nt
to pu1np water and keep the gas out of the 1nine ( Tr.
109). Sixteen letters marked RR were reet:)ived in evidence as part of the t'orrespondenee had touching the
business of defendant

con1pan~·

in 1942.
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In 1943 the annual stockholders meeting was held
in the Felt Building on February 15th (Tr. 112). Considerable friction developed between the company and
the lessees and suit was commenced against the leasing
company (Tr. 113). That there was considerable work
on that suit. It was that suit which necessitated all of
the trips to Provo (Tr. 116). That the witness attended
to securing premiums on the B Bonus allowed by the
R.F.C. Conferences were had with Mr. Gardner in order
to get a loan of $50,000.00. There were 5 or 6 conferences
about the matter; that a Herbert Fay, the R.egional
Engineer of the R.F.C., was threatening to move: the
equipment from the mine of defendant to Colorado (Tr.
117). Exhibit S·S was received in evidence as part of
the correspondence had in 1943 and Exhibit ·TT a.s additional correspondence had during that year as to the
operation of the defendant mine (Tr. 119).

In 1944 a stockholders' meeting was held and the
salary of Mr. Holden was again fixed at $500.00 per
month. That during that year the witness made several
trips to Provo on business of the defendan~ company;
that the witness had correspondence with Willard Cleghorn about the operation of the defendant's mine ('Tr.
1'20). That in 1944 the witness held numerous conferences with people interested in the operations of the
defendant company (Tr. 121-24). That in 1944 the witness made not less than 2 or 3 trips to the mine; that
during that year there were 10 or 15 conferences with
J. C. Jensen in addition to the Combined Metals and
Franklin Scherder corporation. Exhibit UU was received
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in evidence as typical of the correspondence had in 19±4
touching the business of defendant company.
That in 19'45 the first three attempts to hold a stockholders' meeting failed because of there not being enough
stockholders present (Tr. 215). That during the spring
and summer of·1945 the witness spent fully 90 per cent
of his time in an attempt to get the defendant mine going.
Early in 1934, Mr. Crane and Mr. Fay of the R.F.C.
took the position that there was an e1nergency and
something had to be done; that the mine was not operating satisfactorily (Tr. 126). The R.F.C. had loaned the
leasing company $30,000.00 and they wanted their money;
there was plenty of ore, but it was not being mined out
and the company could not get any money unless the
ore was mined; that Cleghorn, Mayhew and Jensen were
interested in leasing the property and it was necessary,
and the witness was trying to find out who would rnake
the best deal and was kept busy between Provo, Spanish
Fork, Lehi and the Dooly Building (Tr. 127). That all
who were interested in the leases had to participate in
the negotiations with the R.F.C. to get the 1noney (Tr.
128). That in 1945 a Mr. Gorman, field engineer for
the R. F. C. and a Mr. Fail held a series of 1neetings
with the lessors and the witness in connection with a
complicated contract that was finally agreed upon. That
contract was six weeks being negotiated (Tr. 129). 'rhat
during the year there were not fewer than 20 1neetings
held in the Booth apartn1ent house in Provo. That the
witness had to negotiate all of the contracts ('rr. 130).
That beginning about in February and eontinuing do"·n
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to the sumn1er there were at least a rninin1un1 of 15 conferences at Lehi or Salt Lake or A1nerican Fork with
Charles illercer because he was acceptable, but he was
trying to get cleared up at ~lercur; that Mercur was
satisfactory to the R. F. C.; that Mr. Booth had put
up most of the money and therefore it was necessary
to get cleared with him and hence the numerous conferences with him. That during the year 1945 the witness made three or four trips to the mine (Tr. 131).
That all of the docwnents were carefully gone over by
the witness. Exhibit VV was offered and received in
evidence, the same being documents gone over by the
witness and the same were negotiated by the witness.
That Exhibit WW was received in evidence as a part
of the
correspondence had in connection with the opera,..
tion'of the mine. of defendant in 1945.
That on May 15, 1946 a stockholders' meeting was
held and a Board of Directors was elected. Mr. Stout
refused to serve a~d was not re-elected (Tr. 133). That
during the year 19'46 there were several conferencs with
Herbert Fay and Willard Cleghorn and Combined Metals
(Tr. 134). That in F'ebruary, 1946 there was a serious
accident at the mine in which 3 or 4 men were gassed;
that there was a question whether the defendant mining
company was liable and whether they were fully covered
with Workmen's Contpensation. There were several conferences concerning that accident ( Tr. 135). In 1946
considerable ore was being shipped from the mine and
the \vitness spent considerable tin1e with Wilson !:fcCarthy and Bradford to secure a sp·ur on the Rio Grande,
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but it did not get the haul. That Exhibit XX 'vas
received in evidence as a part of the correspondence
that was had in 1946 touching the business of the
defendant company (Tr. 136-137).
In 1947 there was the usual stockholders' and
directors' 1neeting, the minutes of which were prepared
by the witness (Tr. 138). The minutes of the 1neetings
were received in evidence as Exhibit YY (Tr. 139-140).
It appears from the minutes of the meeting that Mr.
Gottron n1ade a trip from Chicago to attend the meeting.
He stated that he was entirely dissatisfied with the way
the 1nine was being operated and the salary paid to Mr.
Holden of $4800.00 a year (Tr.140). The minutes further
show that Mr. Holden stated that he had the responsibility of operating the mine and it was proper that he
be paid for his services (Tr. 141). That in 1947 after
Mr. Gottron threatened to bring an action, Mr. Holden
requested the witness to take care of Mr. Gottron and
keep him quiet. ·That on two or three occasions prior
to that time, Mr. Holden told the witness the same thing
(Tr. 144-148). That the witness tried to get Cleghorn
to buy the stock as requested by Mr. H-olden to get rid
of Gottron ('Tr. 149). That the witness contacted Mr.
Gottron by phone and upon three occasions talked to
him in Chicago, once or twice in 1948 ; once in 1950 and
once in 1951; that the witness urged Mr. Gottron to sell
his stock and not bring a suit against the company (Tr.
150-151). That ~vir. Gottron stated that if he could get
Holden out of the n1ine, he Gottron eould raise a quarter
of a Inillion dollars to develop the llline err. 152). That
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in 1947 the witness secured the services of an engine-er
to tnake a stratographer map ('Tr. 153). That during
that year the witness had several conferences with Booth,
Palfrey.rnan and Cannon, Exhibits ZZ were received in
evidence as a part of the correspondence had in 1947
in connection w·ith the operation of the defendant company ( Tr. 155). The check for $1000.00, dated March
29, 1948 and the letter attached thereto was received in
evidence as _._~AA (Tr. 156-157). The witness answered
the letter. Exhibit BBB is the answer. It will be seen
that in the letter the plaintiff was told that if he cashed
the check it would be payment in full for his services up
to that date ('Tr. 157) and in the answer Mr. Beck stated
that he would accept $5500.00 if the same was p,aid
promptly as payment for his services (Tr. 158). That
the witness was given 10,000 shares so he could act as
a director, but he does not know who was to get all
of the 30,000 shares (Tr. 160-161). That the witness
knew nothing about an alleged meeting of the Board of
Directors of the defendant company where he was alleged
to have been voted some stock (Tr. 161-162). That during
the time the witness served as attorney for the defendant company, he received a total of about $2'500.00; that
not more than $350.00 went for expenses (Tr. 163).
That the witness did not get more than $350.00 for his
own use, the remainder was paid to other lawyers. That
since 1945 or 1946 there has been no director, or officer
or agent of the defendant company in Utah other than
the witness ('Tr. 164). The Articles of Incorporation
1nake Salt Lake City, Utah, the principal place of busi-
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ness of the defendant company (Tr. 165). That the suin
of $100,000 was borrowed from the R. F. C. and expended
in developing the property of defandant, all of which
was paid back. There was about one-half million dollars
worth of ore shipped from the mine while Cleghorn
was operating the mine; that while Cleghorn and the
Golden West were operating the 1nine, the witness 'vas
informed that $800,000 worth of ore was shipped (Tr.
166). That during all the time the witness testified to,
the office of the eompany was mentioned in the office
of the witness. That the money paid on assessments
came to the office of the witness or was sent to ~1r.
Holden (Tr. 167). That the lessees paid 15% royalty
('Tr. 168).
With the consent of the court and opposing counsel,
Benjamin L. Rich and Herbert Van Dan1 were called
as witnesses as to the matteT of their opinion as to what
would be a reasonable attorney's fee to be allowed Mr.
Beck.
Mr. Benjamin L. Rich testified that he is and for
49 years has been a lawyer practicing in Salt Lake
City (Tr. 169). That he has had occasion to handle
matters involving the operation of ntining properties;
that he has been in Court and has heard the testhuony
of

~ir.

Beck; that assuming such testi1nony to be true,

the reasonable value of the services during the \vhole
1

period \Vould be between $12,000.00 and $15,000.00 ( '1 r.
170). On cross-examination,

~I r.

Rich gaYe his opinion
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as to the value of the various parts of the service
rendered by the plaintiff (Tr. 170-183).
Herbert \Tan Darn testified that he is and for fifty
years he has been engaged in the practice of law in Salt
Lake City, Utah; that for nearly thirty years such
practice has been aln1ost exclusively related to corporations and mining. That he has heard the testimony of
Mr. Beck and has an opinion as to reasonable value of
such service. That in his opinion the minimum value
thereof is $12,000.00 (Tr. 183-4). On cross-examination,
Mr. Van Dam testified as to the many companies he had
represented and that he had discussed some of the, matters to which Mr. Beck testified (Tr. 184-187).
The plaintiff was re-called and on cross-examination
testified: That Mr. Holden was not a director for the~
first five years after the corporation was formed, but
he directed the operation (Tr. 190-193); that the witness
talked to 1\tfr. Holden about his employment at least
75 times; that the witness was to be paid "when we
get ready to pay the first dividend"; that no dividend
has been paid ('Tr. 193). That the only promise of payment was that the witness would be handsomely paid.
That the witness had asked for payment of this and
that, such as for additional surveys (Tr. 194). That
he asked for money to pay other people; that the plaintiff does not lmow what money, if any, the defendant
cornpany has in the treasury (Tr. 195). That he does
not recall when he asked for money (Tr. 196). That
!fr. Holden said at the Stockholders' meeting that the
21
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company was broke (Tr. 198). That the witness knew
that ore was being shipped, but he did not know what
was being paid the defendant company (Tr. 199). That
a report was made, but the witness could not figure it
out (Tr. 200). That in the fall of 1948, l\Ir. Gottron
stated the co1npany had $32,000.00 in the bank, but he
did not show the witness any paper to bear the staten1ent
out. Exhibits 1 and 2, consisting of a nmnber of letters
were received in evidence ( Tr. 204). Parts of these
letters were read to the jury and dealt with the amount of
money that was rec~ived by the lessees fron1 ore sold
('Tr. 205-207). Plaintiff further testified that no formal
final statements were made by him, but that he rendered
statements between October 28, 1922, to June 16, 1944,
for various amounts ranging in amounts of fro1n $25.00
to $600.00. That the money so paid for the most part
represented payments to engineers, geologists, costs
and attorney's fees, other than himself (Tr. 211-21).
Exhib it 3 was reeeived in evidence and shows various
items of trips to Provo by Mr. Holmgren and the witness and another in the sun1 of $375.00 as pay1nent in
full for services in the case of Dutchlnan Coalition
Mines Co. v. Alma Borne (Tr. 218). The other lawyers
were employed in the litigation and the witness settled
up with them (Tr. 220). Judge Dunford got $100.00.
That the bills were for expenses, not for the time of
the witness (Tr. 221). The witness was not present
1

'vhen a resolution 'vas pa~sPd that 20,000 shares of stock
was to be given hi1n for ~ervices during a period of 1~
year (Tr. 223). ''Phat the stock in the rlefPndant company
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had no value·. An assessment of 1 cent per share was
levied against the stock. Some of the assessments of
1 cent per share was paid (Tr. 227).
The witness recalled that Mr. Holden requested the
witness to present his bill either in 1946 or 1947 and
the witness said he would prefer that he he not paid- -until the next year (Tr. 237-38). That the: witness
received a letter on August 6, 1947 in which Mr. Holden
stated that it may be best to delay any further legal
expenses until this matter (attorney's fees) is cleaned
up. That the witness did not 'regard that letter as
terminating his service-s (T·r. 240). That whe·ri the witness got the letter, Exhibit 7, which did not contain on
the letterhead the name of the witness was the first
time that he realized that something was haywire (Tt.
241). ·That after the witness received the check for
$1000.00 the witness did further correspondence for
defendant company (Tr. 242). . That the· conferences
the witness had with Mr. Gottron were in the interest
of the defendant company and Mr. Gottron (Tr. 243).
That the witness did not link together his claim with
the threat of ~fr. Gottron to bring a law suit (Tr. 243a).
On redirect examination, the witness testified that
in many of the negotiations had, it would have been
impossible to have secured any results unless he represented, not only the defendant company, but also the
persons with whon1 the co1npany tried to do business.
The interests of the parties involved in the various
transactions testified to were not adverse, they all had
'
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to get any money they 1nade out of the ore that was
mined. If the money had not been secured from the
R. F. C. no mining could have been done (Tr. 266).
That the settlement in the letter Exhibit 4 that the
$375.00 and $2'25·.00 checks constituted payment in full
referred to the payment made to Judge Stanley Dunford,
Homer Holgren, docket fees and costs (Tr. 266-2G8).
That any part of that money received by the witness
was probably for telephone, gasoline and getting out
liens; that he does not know definitely (Tr. 268) but
the amount he received from those checks 'vas probably
$25.00 or $50.00 (Tr. 269).
Mr. Holden was called by the plaintiff and testified
that he is here resisting the claim of the plaintiff. The
witness was asked concerning the money had by the
defendant company in 1946, but the Court indicated that
it did not consider such evidence material and the plaintiff did not insist on pursuing that matter ( Tr. 271-272).
Willard Cleghorn was called as a witness by the
defendants and testified as follows : ·That he resides at
American Fork, Utah; that he has been acquainted with
the Dutchman n1ine since 1916 (Tr. 278). That from
1945 to 1949, he was often in A1nerican Fork Canyon;
that he saw ~Ir. Beck a few times at the Dutch1nan
1nine (Tr. 279). That during the period of 1939 to 1942,
Clarence Beck negotiated a loan through the R. E'. C.
for the con1pany he was n1anaging. That the loan was
for another company, but the Dutch1nan mine was discussed (Tr. 281). That Mr. Cleghorn finally took ovt·r
a lease on the Dutclnnan 1nine (Tr. :2R2). Then he dis24
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cussed 1naking· a lease of the Dutchman with Mr. Holden
and ~lr. Beck, but did not 1nake the changes in the lease
that 'vas agreed upon after he contacted Mr. Holden.
F·rank Johnson drew up a satisfactory contract and the
sa1ne was executed (Tr. 183-184). That there was paid
to the witness during 1'946 to 1949 both dates included,
a total of $-!44,758.58 which included all go:vernment
subsidies (Tr. 284). The total amount paid to the
Dutchman in royalties was $41,851.52 (Tr. 285). That
he never gave Mr. Beck a statement of the royalties
paid. That the witness does not recall going up to the
mine with Mr. Beck (Tr. 286).
Alma Bourne, a witness called by defendant testified
m substance as follows: That he now resides at Salt
Lake City, but has resided most of his life in American
Fork (Tr. 294). That ~e has been acquainted with
operations in American Fork Canyon for 30 or 40 years
(Tr. 295). That he got a lease on the mine in 19·30;
that he and Mr. Murphy operated the 1nine in 1938-39
and that ~Ir. Cleghorn took it over in 1944 or 1945 (Tr.
296). That he has been employed by Mr. Holden to look
after the mine from 19!49 on; that he has known Mr.
Beck all his life ; that he has seen Mr. Beck one time
at the mine on a picni'c; that he has not talked with Mr.
Beck at the mine but only on the streets in Salt Lake;
that he has not discussed the mine in Mr. Beck's office
(Tr. 298). That he lived at the 1nine part of the time,
but did not manage the operations (T·r. 299). That
fron1 1941 to 1943 royalties were paid to the defendant
company (Tr. 300). The a1nount was between $7000.00
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and $8000.00; that the witness and not l\lr. Beck
employed Mr. Heist (Tr. 301). Mr. Bourne testified
that he had never been in Mr. Beck's office (Tr. 298)
but later he said he was in his office one time ( Tr. 312).
Mr. Holden was called as a witness by the defendant
and in part testified : That he had been managing
director of the defendant mine since about 1930 and
has held a controlling interest before that time ( Tr. 313).
That in July 21, 1922 the witness paid Mr. Beck $194.00
for incorporating the ·company and preparing the ByLaws (Tr. 315). That the witness did not employ Mr.
Beck, but he knew Mr. Beck was serving the company
(Tr. 316). That the witness told Mr. Beck that he would
pay him as they went along. He did not say he would
pay him handsomely (Tr. 317). Then he asked Mr.
Beck for his bill in 1946 and asked him before and
since (Tr. 317). That he asked him around 1940 and
19'41; that he has no idea about the size of the bill; that
Mr. Beck drew the n1inutes of the co1npany and the
lease to Mr. Bourne and that was all, no, he also drew
the assignment of the lease to the Golden West (Tr. 318).
That in 1946 he told Mr. Beck to send in his bill and
that the directors would not stand for any great bill
and Mr. Beck said he had had a good year and his
income tax would be large and to let it go until next
year and Mr. Beck further stated he would not send
in his bill until he first talked to Mr. Jfolden (Tr. 319);
that in 1947 ~Ir. Beck told the witness that he could
give hin1 $2000.00 on account (Tr. 320); that the witnP~~
told Mr. Beck that he would not pay $2000.00 until he
26
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knew 'vhat he 'vas paying for; that he told Mr. BeeR',
not to do any n1ore legal 'vork on the mine until the bilr
'vas settled and then he went out of the office ; that the
witness and ~ir. Holden were in Salt Lake in the fall
of 1947 and saw Mr. Beck in the Hotel Utah when he
told Mr. Beck that when he last saw him he toJd Mr.
Beck not to do any more work with the mine until the
bill is settled; that Mr. Beck said: ''You can't live in
Los Angeles." I said: "(Tr. 321) I do not want any
more to do with you until. your bill is settled." He said
"you will get your bill" and he turned and went and
that is the last time he saw the witness. Tha.t he wrote
Mr. Beck in January, 1948 saying he would he at the
stockholders meeting. That the witness did not know
that Mr. Beck was performing service for the company
(Tr. 322). That the witness thought Mr. Beck was to
get the patent and did not know until later that Senior
was to do the work ('Tr. 323). That Mr. Beck disappeared
for several years, but he finally located him at Long
Beach. That Mr. Beck originally received 10,000 shares
for which no service was rendered (Tr. 32'4). They were
given to him; that the witness gave Mr. Beck 20,000
shares for preparing the assessmen~; that the directors
meeting when the stock was voted was held in Los
Angeles; that Mr. Beck was not there; that the witness
did not know whether or not notice was given of the
meeting (Tr. 325 ). That the witness prepared the
rninutes; that the second meeting was held to pay Mr.
Beck; that he does not know "\Vhy the second meeting
\Vas

in part a duplication of the first; that Mr. Beck
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saw a copy of the 1ninutes (Tr. 326); that the witness
mailed a copy of the minutes to ~Ir. Beck and gave him
the 20,000 shares of stock; that he does not know 'vhether
or not he mailed the stock; that the stock book was kept
in Los Angeles; that Mr. Beck has had the minute
book in his possession since 1937 ( Tr. 327) ; that all of
the minutes of meetings held prior to 1\Iay 1938 were
in the minute book when the book was given to Mr.
Beck (Tr. 330); that the witness does not remen1ber of
discussing the 20,000 shares of stock with Mr. Beck
(Tr. 331). The company had at the time of the trial
$13,939.52. Exhibit 4, an audit of the business was
received in evidence ( Tr. 337) ; a copy of that exhibit
was given to Mr. Beck. ·The stock in the new company
was sold back to the old stockholders at 14 of a cent a
share ('Tr. 337). A bank book showing the deposits of
the defendant was received in evidence as Exhibit 16
( Tr. 338). That the witness met Mr. Gottron at a stockholders meeting in 1947 when he objected to the salary
paid Mr. Holden and also stated that he, l\lr. Gottron,
desired to be made a director; that Mr. Gottron did
not threaten a law suit or shake his fist in the witness'
face ( Tr. 340) ; that after Mr. Gottron left the meeting
in 1947, Mr. Beck told the witness that he, the witness,
was in the right and that 1\lr. Gottron was a bluff (Tr.
341). That the witness did not employ l\1 r. Beck to
appease Mr. Gottron ('Tr. 341). That the witness
referred l\lr. G-ottron to l\lr. Beek, hut he did not tell
~Ir. Beck to write to G·ottron; that the witness did not
authorize l\lr. Beck to do anything for the con1pany
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about Mr. Gottron (Tr. 344). On cross-examination the
witness testified that Mr. Beck was fired as the attorney
for the company; that he is still a director and that the
office of the company has not been changed (Tr. 34:5).
That the Dutchman does its business in Los Angeles
at the home of the witness, but he has never secured a
franchise to do business in Los Angeles (Tr. 346). That
the witness thinks i\Ir. Beck should he paid for the ·
numerous letters written by him; that Mr. Beck was the
legal adviser of the company and he has nothing to do
with its business (Tr. 348). ·That anyt4ing Mr. Beck
knew of interest to the con1pany the witness exp·ected
Mr. Beck to advise the witness but that was not legal
stuff; that Mr. Beck should not be paid for that, his
stock should pay for that (Tr. 349). The witness does
not think Mr. Book should be p·aid for anything e:x:ce~pt
legal services (T·r. 351). That on July 31, 1946 the
witness wrote a letter to Mr. Gottron in which he stated
that "you will confine your future correspondence to
our attorney, C. R,. Beck .... " (Tr. 365). That the witness does not recall of having revoked that direction
(Tr. 368). That the witness does not know whether Mr.
Beck had notice of the meeting when it was recited by
the minutes that he, Mr. Beck, should receive 20,000
shares of stock (Tr. 372). That the witness is drawing
$50.00 a month fro~ the defendant mine for trying to
get someone interested in it (Tr. 386). A number of
letters written by ~fr. Gottron to Mr. Holden, marked
Exhibit #8, were ad1nitted in evidence over the objection
that the sa1ne were incompetent and heresay as to the
29
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plaintiff. The letters were received in evidence (Tr. 388).
The letters consist of correspondence about the operation
of the mine. There was also admitted in evidence, over
plaintiff's objections, correspondence between Mr. Beck
and Gottron concerning the defendant company and the
manner in which it was being opera ted ( Tr. 4:04-411).
On rebuttal Mr. Beck testified that he saw l\Ir. Holden
in the Coffee Shop of the Hotel Utah in the fall of 1947
but that notwithstanding Mr. Beck spoke to ~Ir. Holden
the latter said nothing (Tr. 412).
The foregoing abstract of the evidence, while
somewhat sketchy, will serve to direct the attention of
the court to the extent and nature of the work done
and the correspondence had by the plaintiff with Mr.
Holden, the :r:nanager and chief stockholder of the defendant company during the ntore than 30 years that the
plaintiff rendered services for the defendant con1pany.
A cursory examination of the nurnerous letters that
were written to and by the plaintiff touching the business
of the defendant co1npany furnish conelu~ive corroboration that the services rendered by the plaintiff
were very extensive and that contrary to the testi1nony
of Mr. Holden that Mr. Beck disappeared for several
years (Tr. 3'24), the constant strean1 of letters between
1\tfr. Beck and Mr. Holden (only a part of which were
offered in evidence) conclusively shows that l\Ir. Beck
was on the job substantially all the tirne during 1nore
than thirty years attending to the business of the defendant con1pany and keeping the absent general 1nanag-er of
such company infor1ned concerning its operation.
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At the conclusion of the evidence the jury brought
in a special verdict for the total sum of $1500.00 for
which amount the court below awarded judgment (R. 43).
A motion for a new trial was made by the plaintiff and
by the court denied (R. 48). This app·eal is p~rosecuted
by the plaintiff.
In the light of these facts it is appellant's contention
that the following prejudicial errors were committe:d
by the trial court which require a reve~rsal of the judgment appealed from and the granting of a new trial
to the appellant.

STATEMENT. OF POINTS RELIED UPON F'O·R
A REVERS.AL OF THE JUD·GMENT
P·OINT ONE·
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE BURDEN WAS ON THE
DEFENDANT TO SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN PAID TO
THE PLAINTIFF FOR HIS SERVICES AS REQUESTED IN
PARAGRAPH TWO OF HIS REQUESTS (R. 23-24).

POINIT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY THE PROPOSITION CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION
2 ·FOR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW T'HE
CLAIM SUED UPON IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (R. 25 and Tr. 492).

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS TO ANSWER ITEM b OF GROUP 3 IN
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THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT
THERE WAS A RUNNING ACCOUNT AND EACH ITEM
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY (R. 20
and Tr. 493).

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUESTING THE
JURY TO ANSWER QUESTION 2 OF GROUP 5 IN THAT
IF MR. HOLDEN WAS PAID WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS
OWING TO HIM THERE WOULD BE NO MONEY TO PAY
PLAINTIFF (Tr. 493 and R. 21).

POINT FTVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL (R. 45 and 48).

ARGUMENT
P·OINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE BURDEN WAS ON THE
DEFENDANT TO SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN PAID TO
THE PLAINTIFF FOR HIS SERVICES AS REQUESTED IN
PARAGRAPH TWO OF HIS REQUESTS (R. 23-24).

The plaintiff requested the jury to answer the
following question:
2. We find by the preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence that the plaintiff has been paid for such
services, the sum of $................ ( R. 23).
The trial court refused such request (R. 24). On
the contrary, the court in it~ inHtructions required the
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plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the amount that remained unpaid for his services which
in effect required the plaintiff to prove by a pre-ponderance of the evidence that the amount claimed to have
been paid by the defendant was in fact not paid (R. 2'5).
Apparently the plaintiff failed to take an exception to
the trial court's failure to give the requested instruction.
Such fact, however, does not preclude this court from
passing upon the error of the trial court in failing to
give the requested instruction or some other instruction
of similar import. Rule 51 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that notwithstanding the failure
to object to the giving or refusing an instruction "the
appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving or failure to give· an
instruction." Independent of this rule, this Court has
held that a new trial may be granted for an error which
is manifestly prejudicial to the party aggrieved. State
v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89; 60 Pac. (2d) 952; State v. Smith,
90 Utah 482; 62 Pac (2d) 1110. This court and the courts
generally have uniformly held that the burden of proof
is on the one claiming payment to establish the same
by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 Am. Jur. 152,
Sec. 148 and cases cited in foot note 2; 40 Am. Jur. S·ee.
278, page 893-4 and numerous cases there cited in foot
notes; 70 C.J.S. page 298; Marks v. Marks 100 Pac. (2d)
207; 98 Utah 400; Bell v. Jones 100 Utah 87, 110 Pac.
327; State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead 82
Utah 416; 25 Pac (2d) 612.
33

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That it is prejudicial error to place the burden of
proof on the wrong party has frequently been held by
this court : Hillyard v. B air, 47 Utah 549 ; 155 Pac. 449 ;
Whipple v. Preece et al, 18 Utah 454; Dimnick v. Utah
Fuel Company, 49 Utah 430; 164 Pac. 872; In re Hanson,.s
Will, 50 Utah 206; 167 Pac. 256.
One of the issues raised in this case was what part
of the services rendered by the plaintiff were paid for.
As illustrative of such issue was the evidence touching
the 20,000 shares of stock in the defendant company
that was delivered to the plai~tiff. It was made to
appear that an alleged 1neeting of the board of directors
of the defendant company was held in c·alifornia, but
so far as appears no notice was given of any such meeting
to the board of directors who did not attend that meeting (Tr. 324-326); that the purpose of giving Mr. Beck
the 20,000 ~hares of stock was not discussed with l\lr.
Beck. The foregoing is the testimony of Mr. Holden.
Mr. Beck testified that he knew nothing about who was
to get the 20,000 shares, but 10,000 were given to hiln
so he could serve as a director and he knew nothing
about the directors' Ineeting held in California when
the stock was directed to be paid to hin1 for services
(Tr. 160-'162). There is other evidence touching the
n1oney received by Mr. Beck and for what purpose it
was used (Tr. 163-165). In light of the fact that plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury that the
burden vvas on the defendant to establish the a1nount
that \Va~ paid for the ~ervices rendered by tltP plaintiff
for the defendant, and the fa<'t that the authoritiPs are
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all to the effect that such is the law and the further fact
that the verdict in this case is so meager when considered
in connection \vith the extensive services rendered by
the plain tiff, as we shall hereafter discuss in detail,
it would seen1 that this is a case where the discretion of
this court should be exercised to the end that a ne·w
trial should be granted on the error of the lower court's
failure to instruct as to the burden of proof even if
an other error was committed.
In the lower court counsel for the defendant contended that because some of the services rendered by
Mr. Beck had been performed so long ago there is a
presumption that the same had been p·aid. This court
has upon at least two occasions held that where there
is evidence touching a fact in controversy, any presumptions that might otherwise exist disappear from
the case. State v. Green 78 Utah 58, 6 P. (2d) 177; In
reNewell'sEstate78Utah463,5P. (d) 230.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY THE PROPOSITION CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION
2 FOR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THE
CLAIM SUED UPON IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS (R. 25 and Tr. 492).

It will be noted that counsel for the plaintiff objected
to the giving of instruction No. 2 which is labeled as
2a, 2b and 2c for the following reasons:
1. That the plaintiff has not made demand for the
paYJnent of the money claimed by him, and until such
35'
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demand is made, no cause of action exists in his favor.
2. Because the evidence shows that the plaintiff
could not have secured personal service of summons
upon this defendant company during the last several
years of the co1npany's doing business within the state
of Utah, or at any time as much as 4 years prior to
the commencement of this action.
3. That the evidence shows without conflict and
as a matter of law that the defendant company acknowledged the existence of this obligation within four years
of the date of the comn1encemen t of this action.
4. That the evidence shows without conflict that
the office of the company was maintained at the office
of Clarence Beck in Salt Lake City, Utah, and that the
evidence further shows that the defendant co1npany by
its director admitted that so1nething should be paid for
such service and also the evidence shows that plaintiff
has been performing services for the co1npany in connection with Mr. Gottron, etc. (Tr. 492-493).
At the outset we digress to observe that in the main
the jury found such facts as precluded the defendant
from availing itself of the bar of the statute of lilnitations and the court awarded plaintiff judgment for the
various a1i1ounts found by the jury. In such case it 1nay
be contended that the errors in the instructions touching
the statute of limitations were not prejudicial. It is the
unifor1u holding of this and other courts that it is error
for the court to instruct the jury on 1na tters that art)
not in issue, or if n1ade an issue by the p]earlings adrnit
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of but one finding under the evidence. In the case of
Jensen v. Utah Railw·ay Co. 72 Utah 366; 2'70 Pac. 349,
in reversing and re1nanding for a new trial a verdict
in the lower court had this to say:
H'Thus the charge falls within the familiar
rule that it is error to give instructions based on
a state of facts which there is no evidence tending
to prove or which the undisputed evidence in the
case shows did not exist even though such instructions contained correct statements of law."
Among the other Utah cases which are to the same
effect is the case of Tyng v. Investment Co. 3'7 Utah 304,
108 Pac. 1109; State Bank of Beaver Cownty v. Hdllingshead 82 Utah 416; 25 Pac. (2d) 612. The authorities
are not agreed as to whether or not it is reversable error
to give instructions outside of the issues. Some of the
cases so hold, others take the view that the question of
whether or not such instructions constitute reversable
error depends upon the question of prejudice to the
complaining party. 3 Am. Jur., 630 and the cases there
cited in foot note.
In this case the instructions are so involved that
a Philadelphia lawyer may well have difficulty in grasping their full import. That the jury was confused by
the instructions is made apparent by their returning into
court and requested the court to explain the Statute of
Limitations (Tr. 494). The trial court orally attempted
to explain to the jury in a general way the purpose of
the statute of lilnitations, but we apprehend that such
explanation tended but to divert the attention of and
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confuse the jury as to the real issues in this case, namely,
what was the reasonable value of plaintiff's services
during the more than thirty years he served the defendant and what amount had the defendant paid the plaintiff therefor. We confess it is difficult to point out with
any degree of certainty as to just what effect the
numerous and involved instruction on the statute of
limitations had on the minds of the jury, but certain it
is that such instructions were calculated to cast doubt
on the validity of plaintiff's claims and as such probably
influenced the jury to- award the plaintiff only a part
of the compensation that he was entitled to receive if
his claim had been freed from such intimation of invalidity. It is quite probable that the jury reduced the
amount to which plaintiff was entitled to receive at
their hands because the court, by its instructions on
the statutes of limitations, had indicated that plaintiff
might be at fault in bringing his action.
It is because of our view that the instructions on
the statute of limitations was prejudicial to plaintiff',s
claim for compensation for services performed that we
have deemed it proper to discuss that subject in this
our opening brief rather than wait for respondent's
brief and then discuss that subject 1natter in a reply
brief.
It is first contended that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run until Mr. Beck 1nade demand for
payn1ent. In the case of Wilson v. Weber Oo'U/YI,ty 100
Utah 141, 111 Pac. (2d) 147, at page 150 of the Pacific
R.eporter, it is said;
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HThe test is whether the performance of the
condition (the demand or notice) is a part of the
cause of action or n1erely a step in the remedy.
If the latter, the statute does not start to run
upon the demand or notice, if the former, it starts
to run upon that demand or notice."
In that case the court cites 37 C.J.S. 955, Sec. 326,
and cases in note 53 where it is said:
"Where, although the cause of action itself
has accrued, some preliminary step is required
before resort can be had to the remedy, the condition referring merely to the remedy and not to
the right, the cause will be barred if not brought
within the statutory period; therefore the preliminary step must be taken within that period."
To the same effect is 54 C.J.·S.. , page 212, S-ec. 201-2.
Again on page 966, Sec. 344, it is said:
"Notwithstanding the general rules requiring
a demand to· be made within a reasonable time
o~. within the period of limitations, the parties
may make a demand a condition p·recedent, and if
it appears -that the money or claim_ which is the
subject of the contract is to be paid on demand
in fact, the statute will not begin to run until
an actual demand has been made. And where the
instrument itself indicates that the calls for payment are to be indefinitely prospective, and are
to be made as might suit the wants or convellience
of the payee, or where a speedier demand would
obviously violate the intention of the parties as
indicated by the terms of their contract, there
is no ground furnished upon which the law can
assume any fixed point as the limit to the reasonable time for making demand.. Where it appears
that the parties contemplated a delay in making
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the demand to so1ne indefinite time in the future,
the statutory period for bringing the action is
not controlling as to the question of reasonable
time."-37 C.J.S. 966, Sec. 344, and 54 C. J. S.,
page 213, Sec. 201-3.
See also the case of Aitken v. Hayward, 156 Pac.
(2d) 59 and cases and authorities there cited.
In this case Mr. Holden was the only person who
knew the amount of money that the defendant company
had or the amount or nature of its outstanding obligations. It was clearly the duty of Mr. Holden to keep the
officers of the defendant corporation advised as to its
financial condition. That being so, neither he nor the
defendant corporation could be heard to make the clailn
that the statute of limitations run against plaintiff's
claims in the absence of a slio:wing that he had knowledge
of such facts. The fact that plaintiff was asked to
present a claim for his services fall far short of infornling the plaintiff as to whether or not there was sufficient 1noney in the hands of the corporation to pay its
obligations, including that of the plaintiff. Indeed
whether there was or was not sufficient funds to pay
his claim would depend upon the amount of his clain1,
and as is held in the case of Aitken v. Hayward, supra
and the cases and authorities there cited, a dentand is
necessary before a cause of action arises where such
is within the conte1nplation of the parties. In this case,
the defendant, by the tender of the $1000.00 chGek and
refusal to pay more started the running of the ~tatute
of li1nitations and therehy \\~aived an~~ de1nand on behalf
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of the plaintiff. This action was brought within the
statutory period after that tender, the same being March
29, 1948.
The second basis for plaintiff's claim that the statute
of limitations were not available as a defense to the
action is that the evidence shows without conflict that .
personal service of swmnons could not have been had on
the defendant after 1946 because there was no person
in Utah other than the plaintiff upon whom service
could be had except upon Mr. Holden who was in Utah
only for a day or two about once a year (Tr. 91-2 and
133).
Prior to taking effect of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure on January 1, 1950 the law dealing with the
service of summons on a corporation provided:
U.C.A., 1943, 104-5-11, subdivision 5:
"The summons must· be served by delivering
a copy thereof. If the defendant is a dome-stic
corporation, to the president or head of the
corporation, secretary, treasurer, cashier or managing agent thereof. If no such p·erson can be
found within the state, then upon a director of
the corporation found within the state."
That section then provides for the person upon whom
summons may be served upon a foreign corporation, but
as the defendant herein is a domestic corporation, such
provisions have no application here.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
becarne effective on January 1, 1950, Rule 4, Subdivision 4 thereof, page 4 provides:
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"Services of swnmons may be had upon any
corporation, not herein otherwise provided for
upon a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a comn1on
name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer,
a managing or general agent, or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process and if the agent is one
authorized by statute to receive service and the
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant. If no such officer or agent can be
found in the county in which the action is brought,
then upon any such officer or agent having the
1nanagement, direction or control of any property
of such corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated association within the state. If no
such officer or agent can be found in the state
and the defendant has, or advertises or holds
itself out as having an office or place of business
in this state, or does business in this state, then
upon the person doing such business or in charge
of such office or place of business."
It will be seen that by ·the adoption of the 11 tah
Rules of Civil Procedure service of smnmons n1ay be had
upon a domestic corporation by service upon persons
otJ:ler than those that may have been served prior to the
adoption and the taking effect of such rules. However,
such fact need not concern us in this proceeding, because
there was only slightly more than two years elapsed between the time the Rules of Civil Procedure took effect
and the time this action \vas conunenced. The I~ules of
Civil Procedure did not have any retroaetivt• effec-t and
therefore if under the provisions of our la\\· as to 'vhou1
1nay be served with su1n1nons in an aetion brought
42
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against a do1nestic corporation becon1es of controlling
importance as to whether the statute of limitations is
available to the defendant herein, that is to say the statute of limitations not having run since the Rules of Civil
Procedure was adopted, no service of summons could
be had upon the defendant before that time exce,pt upon
the officers designated in the 'Statute.
The law seems to be well settled and so far as we can
find the cases are in accord with the doctrine thus stated

in 42 Am. Jur. Sec. 108, beginning on page 93, which we
quote at length._
"A corporation, being an artificial entity,
cannot be personally served with process, and can
be served only through an officer or agent of the
company, or someone designated by law to receive
service of process in its behalf. At common law,
service was made on such head officer of a corporation as secured knowledge of the process to the
corporation, but the practice statutes and rules of
practice of the several jurisdictions now regulate
this matter, and the general form of such statute
is to require service on some particular officer of
the corporation. It is clearly within the power of
the state to determine vvho such officer or agent
shall be and how he shall be designated by the
corporation, provided always that the constitutional guaranties of due process of law are observed. The discussion and analysis of statutes
governing service of process upon a foreign corporation doing business within the state, and the
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classes of officers and agents upon whom service
of process 1nay be made within those statutes, "rill
doubtless pro:ve very helpful in the determination of the meaning and of the construction and
interpretation of provisions regulating service of
process upon domestic corporations.
"When the officer or agent upon who1n serYice of process in an action against a corporation
may be made is specified in the statute or rule of
practice, service must be 1nade upon that identical
officer or agent; otherwise the service is insufficient.
"Even though a person is within the tern1s
of a statute, if his relation to the plaintiff or the
claim in suit is such as to Inake it to his interest
to suppress the fact of service, such service is
unauthorized. Therefore, an officer or agent of
a corporation cannot comn1ence an action against
such corporation by serving hi1nself with process."
It would indeed be a strange doctrine and fraught
with endless possibilities of fraud to per1nit an officer
to secure a judgment in personam against a corporation
by the service of summons upon hhnself. In our seareh
we have been unable to find any authority under a statute such as ours which gives color to such a doctrine.
Indeed, if a statute were to be given such construction,
it would seem that the sa1ne 1nust be held unconstitutional
in that it would offend against the provision of state
and federal constitutions whieh accord to everyone whose
rights are to be affected, due process of lu,v.
The attention of the court is again directed to provisions of lT.C.A. 1943, 104-5-11, whi(·h providPs that the
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persons who n1ay he served with sumn1ons are "the president or head of the Corporation, secretary, treasurer,
cashier or managing agent, and if neither of the foregoing can be found, then service 1nay be had upon a
director found within the state."
It was suggested at the time counsel for the plaintiff urged the vie'v herein expressed that the plaintiff
might proceed against the defendant corporation by
levying an attachment upon the property of the· defendant and thus bring such property within the jurisdiction
of the court and then establish his claim and have the
same satisfied out of the property attached. There are
two reasons why such a procedure could have no bearing upon the statute of limitations. They being
First: The basis for receiving an attaclunent during
the time here involved are provided for in U.C.. A., 1943,
104-18-1. The only provisions of such statute that even
tend to give the color of a right to an attachment under
the facts disclosed in this record, namely "That the defendant conceals himself so that process cannot be served
upon him" are not present. The facts in this case do not
show or tend to show that the defendant or any of its
officers concealed themselves from service of process.
The fact that all of the officers or agents upon whom
service may be had, other than the plaintiff, are absent
from the state is not a concealing from the service of
process any n1ore than would the absence of a personal
defendant who is absent from the state be a concealing
of such person fro1n the service of process. So also the
fact that there is no person within the state of Utah upon
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whom service of S·ummons 1nay be had upon the defendant makes the defendant none the less in law a resident
of the state notwithstanding that there is no officer upon
whom service of summons may be had. In this connection it should be kept in 1nind that even though a
person maintains a residence in the state and a usual
place of abode in which members of his family reside and
upon whon1 service of swnmons may be had, under our
statute the time such a person may be absent from the
state must he deducted from the period fixed by the
statute of limitations as to the outlawing of such a claim.
Our statutes so provide and our courts have repeatedly
so held.
U. C.A., 1943, 104-'2-36 provides :
''If when a cause of action accrues against a
person he is out of the state, the action 1nay be
commenced within the term herein limited after
his return to the state; and if after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the ti1ne
of his absence is not part of the time lin1ited for
the commencen1ent of the action."
The foregoing section has been construed in the following cases: Burnes v .Crane, 1 U. 179; Lawson v.
Tripp, 34 U. 28, 95 P. 520; Keith O'Brien Co. v. Snyder,
51 U. 227, 169 P. 954; Tracey v. Blood, 78 U. 385, 390,
3 P. (2d) 263; Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., G4 U.
391, 231 P. 123.
We have a number of statutes which have, \Ve helieve,
a bearing on the question here presented. A1nong then1
being: U.C.A., 1943, 88-2-12 ·w·hich provide~:
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•'In the construction of these statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute :
'' (5) The word "person" includes bodies
politic. and corporate, partnerships, associations
and companies."
U. C. A., 1943, 88-2-12 provides that:
''The rule of the common law that statut~s in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has
no application to the statutes of this state. The
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the ob ..
jects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules of
equity and the rules of common law in reference
to the same matter the rules of equity shall pre-

vail ."
If effect is given to U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-36 and to
U.C.A., 1943, 88-2-12, subdivision 5 there would seem to
be no logical escape from the conclusion that the sta:tute
of limitations did not run during the time that there was
no officer or agent of the defendant corporation within
the state of Utah that could he served with summons.
T'he purpose and the sole purpose of the provision tolling
the statute of limitations during the time a person is
absent from the state would. seem to be that a plaintiff
should have the full period fixed by the statute not only
to bring his action but to be able to secure a p·eTsonal
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service upon the defendant. The purpose of the law applies equally to an artifical person as to a natural person.
Much might be said that if the statute of limitations does
not run against a natural person during his absence fron1
the state to say that it does run in favor of a corporation whose officers and agents 'vho might be served are
all absent from the state would offend against the provisions of Article VI Sec. 16 and 18 wherein it is provided
that the legislature is prohibited from enacting any law
"granting to an individual, association or corporation
any privilege, immunity or franchise" and that in all
cases where a general law can be applicable, no special
law shall be enacted. It is, of course, elementary that if a
law is subject to two constructions, one rendering the
law valid and the other rendering it invalid, the former
will be adopted.
Among the cardinal rules applicable to the construction of the statutes are the following:
"In the interpretation of statutes, the legi~
lative will is the all important or controlling fartor. Indeed, it is frequently stated in effect that
the intention of the legislature constitutes the
law. The legislative intent has been designated
the vital part, heart, soul, and essence of the la".,
and the guiding star in the interpretation thereof. Accordingly, the pri1nary rule of conHtruction
of statutes is to ascertain and deelare the intention of the legislature, and earry such intention
into effect to the fullest degree. A construction
adopted should not bP such u~ to nullify, dt~stro~·,
or defeat the intention of the legiHla ture. ,.
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~·In the interpretation of a statute, the intention of the legislature is gathered from the provisions enacted by the application of sound and
well settled canons of construction. However,
every technical rule as to the construction of a
statute is subservient and must yield to the expression of the paramount will of the legislature,
since all rules for the interpretation of statutes
of doubtful meaning have for their sole object the
discovery of the legislative intent, and are valuable only in so far as, in their application, they
enable the courts the better to ascertain that intent. It has even been declared that the intention
of the legislature, when discovered, must prevail,
any rule of construction declared by previous acts
to the contrary notwithstanding." 50 Am. Jur.,
page 203-204, Sec. 224.

"It is a general rule that the courts, in the
interpretation of a statute, may not take, strike,
or read anything out of a statute, or delete, subtract, or omit anything therefrom. To the contrary, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect should, if possible,
be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence, and
part of an act." 50 Am. J ur., page 219, Sec. 2'31
and cases cited.
To the same effect see 50 Am. Jur., page 361, Sec.
358 and cases cited in foot notes.
A corporation is, of course, an entity created by
law. It has no existence independent of its stockholders
and officers. It can do business only through its office.rs.
A personal judgment rnay be secured against it by and
only by service of su1n1nons upon its officers. When its
officers upon whom service of sumrnons may be had
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are absent from the state and therefore personal jurisdiction of the corporation cannot be obtained for all
practical purposes, the corporation is absent from the
state. To hold otherwise is to ignore the very basis provided by the legislature for tolling the statute of in1itations during the .absence of the defendant fro1n the state.
Other cases which show or tend to sho'v that the
statute of limitations was tolled during the tiine there
was no officer in Utah upon whon1 service of sununons
could he had are: Sherman v. Buffalo Bayou, B & 0 R.
Co., 21 Tex. 349; which holds that where a corporation
maintains an office where service of summons n1ay be
had, it cannot be said the corporation is beyond the state.
By inference if service cannot be had the statute is tolled.
In the case of Closeport Coal, et.c., Co. v. Kingsbury, 10
Ky 118, it is held that where a corporation is dissolved
and officers, agents and managers have left the state so
that no one remains on whom process can be served the
statute of limitation does not run in its favor. That case
is cited as being the law in 37 C.J. 1000 Sec. 395 'vhere
other cases to the same effect are cited, Casey v. Anl,erican Bridge Co., 116 Minn. 561; 134 N.W. 111, 38 I~.R.A.
N S 521; Atchinson etc. R . Co. v. Mills, 53 Tex. Civ. A.
359; 116 S.W. 852. The cases generally are to the effect
that if personal service may not be had on a eorporation
whether foreign or domestic, the statute of lirnitation
is tolled during the tin1e that service cannot be had.
Another reason why the statute of liinitation~ is not
available as a defense to plaintiff's aetion is that thPre
'vas an acknowledgen1ent of the clai1n sued upon.
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U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-45 provides that:
Hln any case founded on contract, when a part
of the principal or interest shall have been paid,
or an ackno\vledgment of an existing liability, debt
or claiJ:n, or any promise to pay the same, shall
have been made, a:n action may be brought within
the period prescribed for the same after such payInent, acknowledgrnent or p-romise; - - etc."
There are a number of cases cited in the foot note to
the statute just quoted from this and other jurisdictions.
The cases from our own court as well as the courts generally make a distinction between an acknowledgment
or pronrise to pay after the statute has run and the cases
where the statute has not run and there is a mere· acknowledgment. This case falls within the latter. When
the statute has run the action by some of the authorities
must be brought on the new promise and so in those cases
a mere acknowledgment will not suffice·. We need not
consider such cases because the statute of limitations
had not run when on March 29, 1948 the defendant,
through Mr. Holden acknowledged that the defendant
was obligated to p·ay the plaintiff for his services. The
fact that defendant claimed the $1000.00 check was sufficient to pay the obligation does not nullify the acknowledgment. On the contrary, the effect of the· letter accompanying the check was a clear acknowledgment of an
obligation to pay whatever was owing. The most that can
be said for the letter is that if the same was cashed, the
defendant would consider the plaintiff p~id for his services up to that date. To say that such language deprives
the letter of any acknowledgment of the debt is to ignore
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the clear meaning of the language used. If plaintiff were
here seeking to recover on the letter which accompanied
the check, an entirely different situation would be presented, and if such were the case we entertain no doubt
that defendant can produce cases and other authorities
that under such a state of facts which hold the action
could not be maintained for anything in excess of the
$1000.00. Such is, as we read then1, the holding of such
cases as O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 Utah 578, 160 Pac.
1192 and Weir v. Bauer, 7'5 Utah 498, 522, Pac. 936.

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS TO ANSWER ITEM b OF GROUP 3 IN
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT
THERE WAS A RUNNING ACCOUNT AND EACH ITEIVI
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY (R. 20
and Tr. 493).

Plaintiff's claim falls under the provisions of U.C.A.,
1943, 104-2-23 now U.C.A., 1953, 78-12-25, where it is
provided:
"An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in \vriting ~
also on an open account for goods, wares and Iuerchandise, and for any articles charged in a store
account; also on an open account for work, labor
or services rendered or 1naterial~ furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing- ('H;-o:P~
may be c.ouunenced at any tin1e within four yPa rs
after the last charge is 1nade or the last payn1ent
is received."
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The following cases fron1 this jurisdiction have con.;.
strued the foregoing statute, son1e of which are before
it was amended in 1935. O'Donnell v. Pa.rker, 48 Utah
578, 160 P. 1192; Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239, 158 P. 788;
Gulbra,nson v. Thonzpson, 63 Utah 115, 22·2 P. 590, where
it is said that \Yhere services were rendered to a decedent
covering a period of a number of years with temporary
intermissions of a few months, it was held that the, services being deemed continuous the bar of the statutes did
not attach and the clai1n that the cause was barred was
without merit. The meaning of an open account is discussed at some length and numerous cases will be found
collected in foot notes to the text in 1 Am. Jur. 265, et
seq. It will be noted contrary to defendant's contention
that an account is none the le·ss such although not in
writing. Thus it is said that "The term 'open account'
means ordinarily an account based upon running or current dealings between the parties which has not be~en
closed, settled or stated and in such the inclusion of further dealings between the parties is contemplated."
Numerous cases are there cited under note 14.
\

In this case there is no substantial conflict in th'e
evidence as to the relations of the plaintiff and defendant.
Such relation being that the plaintiff was the attornery
for the defendant and as such was from time to time
requested to do such legal and other services as 'vere requested to be perforrned by Mr. Holden. H e also fur1

nished the defendant an office in which to transact such
business as it may have in the State of Utah.
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As to the matter of the use of the office of the plaintiff by the defendant, it seems to be the position of the
defendant that such fact did not enter into this case. If
such a claim is made it cannot, in the light of 15b and
49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, be successfully maintained. Rule 15b, page. 24 provides :
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such anrendments
of the pleadings as 1nay be necessary to cause
then1 to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time even after judg1nent, etc."
Rule 49 in part provides that:
"If in so doing (submitting case to jury for
spe-cial verdict) the court o1ni ts any issue of fact
raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each
party waives his right to a trial by jury of the
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires
he demands its submission to the jury."
We direct these matters to the attention of the court
primarily for the purpose of showing the futility of attempting to ge;t a finding of a jury on the question of
whether or not the acconnt here involved was or was not
such as that provided for by U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-23. 1\ioreover an account may w·ell be such that a part thereof becotnes fixed and when so fixed and deter1nined the statutes of li1nitations runs after it is so fixed and in part
such an account as that conte1nplated hy lT.C.A., 194:~,
104-2-23. In this case the proC'eeding to ran<·el out the

54

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

holders of the Golden West in so far as it related to
1noney paid to plaintiff to pay those who assisted in that
proceeding may well bH, and indeed doubtless was, an independent and unrelated transaction, but from that fact
it by no means follows that plaintiff's account with the
defendant was not such an account as that contemplated
by U.C.A. 1943, 104-2-23. Indeed it is almost inconce,ivable that in light of the continuous exchange of corre1spondence touching the business of t~e corporation and
the fact that the office of the company was that of the
plaintiff who furnished his own stationery and secretary
in the transaction of the defendant's business as well as
his own; that the plaintiff's employment can be regarde:d
as anything other than such as that contemplated by
U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-23. For the plaintiff to have made
charges for each item of work he did, es.pHcially e·ach
letter he ·wrote for the defendant, would in many instances have required as much time as it did to write the
letter or do other small jobs. Without p-ursuing this
phase of the ca.s'e further, it is plaintiff's position that
most of the work that was done by plaintiff falls clearly
within both the letter and spirit of U.C.A., 1943, 104-2-2'3,
and it was the: province of the court to so conclude as a
1natter of law.
Th'e following quotation from 58 Am. Jur. 556, S-ec.
56 contains what we believe to be~ a full and concise sta:tement of the law touching the statute of limitation as to
labor performed:
"Where a clai1n for work, labor, or se,rvices
perfor1ned is based upon distinct contracts for the
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items sp'ecified, it would seen1 that the statute
of limitations would com1nence to run as to those
items represented by each contract. But where the
matters specified in the claim are the outgrowth
of an entire contract for continuous labor or services, the den1and will he considered as an entire
one and the statute will not attach until the conlpletion of the contract. Where services are rendered under a contract of en1ployment which does
not fix th·e term of service or the time for payment, the contract is continuous and the statute
of limitations does not con1mence to run until the
employee's services are terminated. Where, however, the hiring of services is without agreen1ent
as to terms or amount of compensation, and there
is no evidence of payments, the law, it seen1s, will
not imply an agreement that payment of coinpensation shall be postponed until the tern1ination
of the employment; in such cases the court 1nay,
as bearing upon the· time the statute con11nences to
run consider a prevalent custom or usage· appropriate to the kind of service as to the ti1ne 'vhen
payments are us.ually n1ade. But it has been held
that regular payments for a period of ti1ne of a
part of the 1nonthly wages earned by a servant,
who has been working for his employer for several
years without a settleme:nt, will1nake the account
mutual for the purpose of determining whether
any part is barred by the statute of li1nitations.
"When compensation for services is not to be
rnade until a certain date, or the happening of a
certain event, the statute of lilnitations doeR not
begin to run until the time so fixed, and, aeeordingly, full co1npensa.tion n1ay be· recovered at la"·
for all services perfor1ned prior to that datP.
B'rhe settled rule that the ~tatute of liruitation::-; begins to rw1 upon the aecrual of a cause of
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action applies in actions on implied and quasi contracts.
The statute does not conunenee: to run against
the right to recover the reasonable value of personal services rendered under an unenforceable
agreement for compensation upon their termination, until such termination."

POIN·T FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUESTING THE
JURY TO ANSWER QUESTION 2 OF GROUP 5 IN THAT
IF MR. HOLDEN WAS PAID WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS
OWING TO HIM THERE WOULD BE NO MONEY TO PAY
PLAINTIFF (Tr. 493 and R. 21).

The evidence shows that in 1941 upon motion of Mr.
Holden he was allowed a salary of $500.00 per month and
he was reimbursed $1700.00 for expenses (Tr. 98). In
1944 the salary of Mr. Holden was again fixed at $500.00
per month (Tr. 120) notwithstanding the mine had been
closed down for a substantial period of time. Mr. Holden
was paying him8elf $50.00 per month up to and at the!
time of the trial for trying to get someone interested in
the mine (Tr. 386). At the time of the trial the company
had in cash $13,939.'52. It is thus obvious that if Mr.
Holden had b~n paid his $500.00 a month· from the time
that he secured the passage of the resolution there would
have been no money with which to pay the plaintiff for
his services. It is not made to appear by what authority
Mr. Holden was paying to himself $50.00 per month for
trying to get someone interested in the mine. It is quite
obvious that he regarded the defendant company as. his

•
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own personal property and took from its funds 'vhatever
suited his purposes. Mr. Holden had been paid bet~..een
$25,000.00 and $26,000.00 for services which in the n1ain
were performed by the plaintiff herein (Tr. 426-427).
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL (R. 45 and 48).

Within the time allo~ed by law the plaintiff filed
a Motion for a New Trial upon various grounds, three of
which we~re "Inadequate damages or con1pensation appearing to have been given under the influence of passion
and prejudice" and "Insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict and that it is against law" and "Errors
in law."
Plaintiff has heretofore discussed what he claims
were errors of law in the matter of the court's instructions to the jury. Those are the errors in law that plaintiff claims are among the reasons why a new trial should
have been granted. The other two grounds, above Inentioned, which plaintiff claims entitled hin1 to a new trial
are so inter-related that we shall discuss then1 together.
We have heretofore directed the attention of the
court to the fa0t that the plaintiff served the defendant
as its attorney and in the eapacity of keeping its general
manager who lived in California advised in all 1natters
connected with the operation of thP defendant IuinP.
lie also furnished the defendant eo1npany \vith an oft'it·f~
and provided a stenographer, stationery, a telephone
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and sta.n1ps to carry on its business. Plaintiff also provided himself with the Ineans of conveyance~ and paid the
expenses of his numerous trips to and from the mine in
American F·ork Canyon, about sixty miles from Salt Lake
and to and from Provo, Alnerican Fork and Lehi in Utah
County on the business of the defendant company. He
has received from tl1e defendanjt company a total of about
$2500.00 not more than $350.00 of which was for his own
use, the remainder was paid to other lawyers (Tr. 163).
It may be here observed that Mr. Holden had control of
all the disbursements of the money belonging to the defendant company and he does not dispute the testimony
of the plaintiff in such particular. Mr. Holden did tetstify
of having paid for drawing up the Article~s of Incorporation and By-laws which were items for which plaintiff
was not making a claim in this action. It does appear
that Mr. B·eck was given 10,000 shares of the stock in defendant company so that he could s:erve as a dir~ctor an·d
an additional 20,000 shares came into his possession for
some reason not known to the plaintiff. ·This stock, however, was of little if any value (Tr. 227).
Thus the $350.00 which was paid to the· plaintiff
throughout the years and tlre $1500.00 allowed by the
jury makes a total of $1850.00 for more than thirty years
of service as an attorney and in effect t'he local manager
of the def·endant company with ,an office., the sHrvices of a
stenographer when needed, stationery, the use of a telephone and the furnishing of trans.portation thrown in for
good n1easure. For thes-e se:rvices and expenses, if tlre
verdict of the jury is permitte~d to stand, plaintiff will
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receive only slightly in excess of one dollar per week,
and is required to wait an average of fifteen years before
he is to be paid. Thus if interest on the money which he
did not receive was earned is to be taken into conside·ration, he will receive less than 50c per week and if consideration be given to the fact that money is now worth
only about one-half what it was worth when the plaintiff
performed the service, the con1pensation would be at the
rate of 25c per week. MoreOiver, it is a matter of conm1on
knowledge that if paym·ent is dependent on a contingency
a reasonabl'e compensation should be at least twice as
much as if payment were certain. Thus, the plaintiff
will in effect receive, under the award of the jury, not to
exceed lOc or 12c per week for his labor and expenses in
representing the def·endant ,company since 1921 up to
tire commencement of this action in 1951. Such an an1ount
will probably not p·ay the amount that plaintiff expended
for the benefit of def·endant.
It would extend this brief far beyond reasonable
limits to itemize and co nun en t on the various ite1ns of
services, including the: correspondence rendered for and
on behalf of the defendant company. An exan1ination
of the numerous letters written ~and received by the plaintiff are indicative of the tin1e plaintiff devoted to the
business of the defendant in addition to the legal and
other work he did as te~stified to by hi1n. Nor wru-; all
of the legal services rendered by the plaintiff the ordinary and usual work that cornes to an attorney'~ office.
The services plaintiff rendered in such Ina tter~ us ~P
euring loans fron1 the lT nited States 0-oyernJnPnt \\'Pre in
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a special and unusual field. When gas develop,ed in the
mine which was being operated by less.ees, a somewhat
unusual problem was prese·nted to determine whether or
not the defendant company was liable in damage:s for the
injury and death of son1e of the miners. Both B·enjamin
L. Rich and Herbert Van Dam ~re attorneys of long
experience in attending to such n1atters as those which
the plaintiff performed for defendant company. After
hearing the evidence of Mr. Beck they each placed the
value of such services at at least $12,000.00. While we
are mindful that a jury or other finder of the fact is not
bound by opinion evidence, yet it is equally well serttled
1aw that the fact finding tribunal may not totally ignore
such testimony. That in this case the jury ignorHd such
testimony is made obvious in that they found the· s:ervicers
of the plaintiff worth only 1/8 of that fixed by Me1ssers
Rich and Van Dam.
The trial court was in accord, in part at l~eas:t, with
the opinion of Messers Rich and Van Dam in that while
he denied a new trial, he stated into the record that:
"This Memorandwn is written at the request
of counsel for the plaintiff because the request
made by the Court referred to herelin had not been
preserved.
."After denying the plaintiff's motion for a
new trial, I became conS'cious of a confli0t in the
decisions of the Utah Supreme C:ourt, to~wit:
Pauly v. Wilson McCarthy, Utah Supreme
Court No. 6846;
Duffy v. Union Pacific, Utah Supreme Court
No. 7294; and
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Wheat v. Denver & Rio Grande, Utah Supreme Court No. 7838.
and requested fue, Court Clerk to call the attorneys, on both sides, and have them check these decisions, and re-argue the 1notion for a ne\v trial if
they desired.
"My reason for the request was that I was
of the opinion that the verdict was inadequate, but
on the Motion for N~·w Trial no evidence was presented of passion or prejudice, except as n1ight
be inferred from the small an1ount of the verdict.
"Without eyidence of passion, I felt that under
Rule 59 (a) (5) on excessive or inadequate damages, a new trial could not be granted. Under
that rule we 'have been granting new trials, conditional upon the failure of the plaintiff to reduce
the a1nount of the verdict, where passion existed,
and then in the Wheat case, such a reduction was
allowed within the existence· of pas~sion.
"The Court was of the opinion that perhapf-' if
the ve·rdict could be reduced a new trial could also
be granted on the s1ame basis. This option, ho\Yever, was developed subsequent to the denjal of a
mOition for a new trial in this eas·e, and I de·sired
a re~a.rgument upon that basis.
"'The Court was late.r inforn1ed by counsel for
the plaintiff that i~t was perhaps too late to argue
a r·econsideration of the 1notion for a ne'Y trial.
"Dated this 3rd day of June, 1953.
(S)

JosEPH

G.

JEPPSON

District Judge."
If we had been able to convince ourselves that the
trial court ha.d jurisdiction to reconsider plaintiff's ulotion for a ne"· trial, we rertainl~r \Vould haYe urged such
62

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

action. However, the motion for a ne:w trial had be1en
denied for more than 10 days before we had an in.dioation
that the court below was disp9sed to further conside·r ~the
motion for a new trial. We can find nothing in thei rules
that permit sueh procedure, particularly after the, time
for making such a motion has expired. We we.re then
fearful and we still entertain the view that if a mortion
had been made for a reconsideration of the mortion for a
new trial, the later motion would he of no avail, and ·if
a new trial should be granted and thereafter if it should
be held that the motion for recon'sideration was a nullity,
our time f.or appeal from the: judgment would doubtless
have expired and we would be without any right to have
the judgment reviewed by 'this court. On the other hand,
if the Court should refuse to reconsider the motion for a
new trial or after hearing the same should deny a new
trial, the results would, we· feared, be the same, n·amely,
th!at the time for appeal would have. expired before 'an appeal could have been taken. If we had been able to find
any authority to suppo~t a motion before1 the lower court
to reconsider our motion for a new trial, we certainly
would have pursued that cause before going to t!he expense and labor of app:ealing this case to this court.
In the cas:e of Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383; 113 Pac.
1023, it is held ·tha:t the distriet court is without p-ower
to entertain 'a motion for a rehearing of an order denying a new trial ·and that the time for appe~al begins to run
fvom the time of the origin~al order denying a ne:w trial.
To the same effect is Lund v. Third District Court, 90
Utah 433; 62 P.a.c. (2d) 278. It will be noted that the
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trial judge in his memorandmn heretofore quoted as to
why he deni:ed the motion to grant a new trial, refe·rs to
Rule 59 (a) (5) und three Utah 0ases. We have read and
re-read ~the Utah cases referred to but are unable to find
anything said or decided in those eases which preclude
the gr~arrting ·of a new trial, but on the contrary, the doctrine announced in those and other cases in this jurisdiction require·s the granting of a new trial. We are not
entirely clear if the trial judge entertained the view that
before a new trial could be granted there must be some
evidence independent of the size of the verdict to support
a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 (a) (5) and the
cases refe·rred to in his me1norandurn. If such were the
view of th·e trial judge he was, we believe, clearly in
error. It is to say the least that it would be extremely
difficult if not impossible to show that a verdict is excessive or inadequate except by the amount of the verdiet
when viewed in light of the evidence. Even if one juror
were willing to sign an Affidavit that S 0ine of his fellow
jurors acted under the influence of passion, such an affidavit would doubtless be rejected. Black v. Rocky JJJ t'll.
B·ell Tel. Co., 26 Utah 451, 73 Pac. 514; People v. Flynn,
7 Utah 378; Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465; 267 Pac. 188.
This court has frequently had occasion to announce the
rules that should guide the trial eourt in pa~~ing upon a
n1otion for a new trial. An1ong such cases are: Clark
v. Los Angeles and· S. L. R. Co., 73 {T. 48G, :275 Pae.
1

582 where it is said that if the trial tourt is of the opin-

ion that ijhe jury in rendering its verdi<'t

the

1uanife~t

weight of the evidPnce, or

di~regarded

Ini~eoneeivPrl
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it, or

disobeyed the charge, or were influ,enced through pas:s±orn
or prejudice, the court 'vould not only be authorized, but
it would be its duty to grant a new trial.
Other cases of similar import are: Duffy v. Union
Pac. R. R. Co., 218 Pac. (2d) 1080; Meehan v. Foley, 235
Pac. (2d) 497; Wheat v. Denver & R. G. Co., 250 Pac.
(2d) 932; Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah
568, 207 Pac. (2d) 178. Numerous other casHs dealing
with tJhe question of when and when nort a nerw trial may
or should be granted have been decided by this court but
no useful purpose will be served by adding to the cas·es
ahove cited.
In many of the cas'es it is said that the granting of a
new trial is largely witJhin the discretion of the trial
judge. While in tills case the trial court denie;d a new
trial, it is made to appear from the memorandum here·tofore quoted that his failure to grant a new trial was apparently caused by his having misconstrued some of t!he
recent decisions of this court.
Before concluding thi·s Brief it should be noted tha:t
while a majority of the cases which have. been before this
court are cases where the· claim is made that the verdicts
are excessive, the principles of law effecting tilie granting
of a new trial are the same· whether the amoun-t of the
verdict brought in que~stion is e·xces~sive or inadequate.
The;re is, hOiwever, probably this difference·; if a verdict
is deemed excessive, the courts may require a reduction
of the verdict, or upon !a failure of a consent to such
reduction a new trial will be granted. That is. p~roibably

65

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not so where a verdict is inadequate because as son1e of
the courts have said that if tlre court exacts an increase
in the verdict as a condition. for not granting a new trial,
such action of the court is in effect the court exercising
the functions of the jury, because the jury has never
found a verdict for the excess while in case where tl1e
amount of the verdict is to be decreased to avo id the
granting of -a new trial, the jury has found the runount
of the reduced verdict and something in addition thereto.
1

We submit that the judg1nent appealed fron1 should
be reversed and a new trial ordered and appellant a'varded his costs.

Respectfully submitted,

REED N. NIE·LSON
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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